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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent empirical and numerical studies indicate that labor supply is aﬀected by uncertainty
about future wages. For example Parker et al. (2005) ﬁnd that self-employed American work-
ers self-insure by working longer hours in response to greater uncertainty. Similarly, using a
calibrated model, Low (2004) ﬁnds that young workers with much unresolved wage uncertainty
work longer hours than old workers with little remaining wage uncertainty, and that labor-supply
ﬂexibility aﬀects saving decisions over the life cycle. Low also demonstrates that allowing for
labor-supply decisions and wage uncertainty is important for generating life-cycle consumption,
savings, and labor supply paths that are consistent with real-world data.
In this paper, I analyze these mechanisms theoretically. More speciﬁcally, I examine how
labor supply can be used to self-insure against wage uncertainty, and how labor-supply ﬂexibility
aﬀects precautionary saving. Previous theoretical studies have typically focused either on how
uncertainty aﬀects saving in the absence of labor-supply decisions (Kimball 1990), or on how
uncertainty aﬀects labor supply in static settings without saving decisions (Eaton and Rosen
1980, Hartwick 2000, and Parker et al. 2005). To analyze how labor-supply ﬂexibility aﬀects
saving, it is necessary to use a framework where both labor-supply and saving decisions are en-
dogenous, but I also demonstrate that allowing for saving decisions enhances our understanding
of how labor supply responds to wage uncertainty.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) showed that the eﬀects of uncertainty on labor supply are ambiguous
and that future labor supply can increase in response to increased wage uncertainty if risk
aversion is suﬃciently high.1 I show here that when saving is endogenous, the tendency for wage
uncertainty to reduce future labor supply is stronger, and wage uncertainty unambiguously
reduces future labor supply when preferences are consistent with balanced growth. This ﬁnding
is intuitive. Just as increased uncertainty tends to raise future consumption, it tends to raise
future leisure. But to simultaneously raise future consumption and future leisure, it must be
possible to shift resources between periods and saving cannot be ignored.
In another related paper, Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) analyzed how labor-supply
ﬂexibility inﬂuences investors’ portfolio decisions. One of their ﬁndings is that greater ﬂexibility
induces more risk taking. One might therefore expect that greater labor-supply ﬂexibility also
would make agents less prudent. But this will typically not be the case. The analytical and
numerical investigations in this paper show that labor-supply ﬂexibility raises precautionary
motives when wages are stochastic. Of course, ﬂexibility does not reduce welfare, so expected
utility is higher with ﬂexible labor supply even if precautionary saving increases. With ﬁxed
labor supply, all eﬀects of a negative shock must be absorbed by consumption. With ﬂexible
labor supply, hours worked can be adjusted to alleviate the eﬀect of the shock. By the same
argument we note that a certain amount of savings is less costly for agents when labor supply
is ﬂexible. Therefore, agents with ﬂexible labor supply are willing to expose themselves to more
risk but they can more easily save to self-insure against uncertainty.
This last point, that ﬂexibility facilitates saving, resembles the Le Chatelier-Samuelson prin-
ciple (Samuelson 1972). The contents of this principle is that the elasticity of demand of one
variable is greater when other variables are allowed to adjust to price changes than when other
variables are held ﬁxed. In the present case, the amount of uncertainty is related to the value of
saving. Here then, saving will increase more in response to increased uncertainty if labor supply
is ﬂexible, provided that this eﬀect dominates the eﬀect on risk tolerance.
1Hartwick (2000) and Parker et al. (2005) use similar static frameworks and also conclude that wage uncertainty
has ambigious theoretical eﬀects on labor supply.
1The measure of prudence (Kimball 1990) is closely related to risk aversion. Kimball and
Weil (2003) broke that link, and showed that both high risk aversion and high intertemporal
elasticity of substitution tend to imply much prudence. The present paper illustrates this point.
Agents with decreasing absolute risk aversion can insure against wage ﬂuctuations by bringing
much wealth into the risky period, and if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high, it
is less costly to shift wealth across periods.
Recent work by Low (1999, 2004), Marcet et al. (2002), and French (2003) examines how
labor-supply decisions, savings, and uncertainty interact in dynamic equilibrium models. Low’s
papers are particularly relevant since they illustrate quantitatively many of the mechanisms
that I examine theoretically. He assumes Cobb-Douglas utility and solves numerically a life-
cycle model with wage uncertainty for diﬀerent values of the intertemporal elasticity. He ﬁnds
that uncertainty raises labor supply of young agents. This is consistent with my ﬁndings in
Section 4: more future uncertainty implies more labor supply today. Low further ﬁnds that
there is more saving when labor supply is ﬂexible rather than ﬁxed, and he ﬁnds a U-shaped
relationship between total savings and the intertemporal elasticity when labor supply is ﬂexible.
When labor supply is ﬁxed, he ﬁnds a negative relationship between savings and the elasticity.
All this is consistent with my theoretical analysis based on Cobb-Douglas utility (Section 3.3). I
interpret this as a strong indication that the results derived in the simple two-period framework
are relevant also for settings with more realistic dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. I present a two-period model with saving
and labor-supply decisions in Section 2. Thereafter, in Section 3, I describe how to measure
the strength of precautionary saving motives in this framework. I compare this measure to the
standard measure as deﬁned by Kimball (1990), and I use the measure of precautionary strength
to examine how labor-supply ﬂexibility aﬀects precautionary saving in a two-period economy. I
show that labor-supply ﬂexibility typically raises precautionary saving. In Section 4, I examine
how uncertainty aﬀects incentives to work. I show that more wage uncertainty unambiguously
has a positive eﬀect on current labor supply but a negative eﬀect on future labor supply. Section
5 concludes.
2A t w o - p e r i o d m o d e l
Let us consider a standard two-period model where agents in each period choose consumption,
c,l e i s u r e ,l, and saving, s. Assume that preferences are time-separable, captured by the instan-
taneous utility function u(c,l) which is strictly concave, i.e. ucc,u ll < 0, uccull − u2
cl > 0,a n d
‘precautionary’, i.e. uc,u l,u ccc,u lll > 0. Further, agents are assumed to have one unit of time
to dispose of, and throughout the analysis we assume interior solutions for the leisure choice.2
Let us also abstract from discounting and assume zero interest rates, and assume that the agent
has no initial ﬁnancial wealth.
The ﬁrst-period wage rate is certain, w1 = w, while the second-period wage rate w2 is
uncertain. The budget constraints are thus
c1 =( 1 − l1)w − s, (1)
c2 =( 1 − l2)w2 + s. (2)
Let ε denote a second-period wage shock with mean zero and variance σ2, and assume that
w2 = w + ε.
2The analysis reduces to the standard analysis with exogenous labor supply if leisure is at a corner solution.
2Agents choose consumption and labor supply to maximize u(c1,l 1)+E εu(c2,l 2). Given
the time-separable utility, the leisure choice in each period is a function of contemporaneous
consumption and wages,
ul (ct,l t)=wtuc (ct,l t). (3)
This, together with (1) and (2) deﬁnes the leisure choices as functions of saving and the shock,
l1 ≡ L1 (s),a n dl2 ≡ L2 (s,ε). The indirect ﬁrst-period utility function is then
¯ v(s)=u[(1 − L1 (s))w − s,L1 (s)],
and the indirect second-period utility is
v(s,ε)=u[(1 − L2 (s,ε))w2 + s,L2 (s,ε)]. (4)
Agents choose saving in the ﬁrst period, s, to maximize expected indirect utility Eε [¯ v(s)+v(s,ε)].
The ﬁrst-order condition is then
¯ vs (s)+E εvs (s,ε)=0 . (5)
3 Precautionary savings
Pratt (1964) showed that −ucc/uc is a good measure of absolute degree of risk aversion. While
risk aversion measures how an agent’s utility is aﬀected by uncertainty, prudence and precau-
tionary saving measure how an agent’s decisions are aﬀected by uncertainty. Leland (1968) and
Sandmo (1970) ﬁrst formalized this concept and showed that a positive third derivative of the
utility function is crucial for obtaining precautionary saving. Kimball (1990) paralleled Pratt’s
analysis and showed that a good measure of the absolute degree of prudence is −uccc/ucc.
To derive a measure of precautionary strength that can be used in our setting, let us follow
Kimball (1990) and use a second-order expansion of the ﬁrst-order conditions to ﬁnd an ap-
proximate expression for saving. Expand ¯ vs and vs around s =0and ε =0in (5), and ignore
high-order terms, to get




vs (0,0) + vss (0,0)s + vsε (0,0)ε +
1
2
vsεε (0,0)ε2 + vssε (0,0)sε
¸




Note that s =0solves (5) when σ2 =0given our assumptions of no initial wealth, no
discounting, and zero interest rate. It then follows that vs (0,0) = −¯ vs (0),a n dvss (0,0) =
¯ vss (0). So if (5) is fulﬁl l e d ,w eh a v et h a t
0=[ −vs (0,0) + vss (0,0)s]+
∙






Deﬁne precautionary strength as η = −vsεε















3.1 A note on precautionary strength
We will use (6) to examine how labor supply ﬂexibility in combination with wage uncertainty
aﬀect precautionary saving. Before that, however, let us consider how this measure of pre-
cautionary strength relates to Kimball’s measure of prudence. We could have measured the
precautionary strength by the equivalent variation premium ψ that solves
EεVs (0,ε)=Vs (0 − ψ,0),
where V (s,ε) ≡ ¯ v(s)+v(s,ε) is the indirect life-time utility. A second-order expansion of Vs












This deﬁnition of precautionary strength thus results in the same approximation of saving as the
derivation leading to (6), but it deviates slightly from Kimball’s (1990) deﬁnition of prudence.
Kimball (1990) deﬁnes prudence from the equivalent variation premium ˆ ψ that solves
EεVs (0,ε)=Vs
³
0,0 − ˆ ψ
´
,
which here results in











The deﬁnitions of ψ and ˆ ψ result in equivalent (up to a scale factor) measures of precautionary
strength if the decision variable and the stochastic variable enter additively in the value function
and are measured in the same units, as for example in the cases analyzed by Kimball (1990). In
the present framework, ˆ ψ would measure how much the non-stochastic wage would have to be
reduced for saving decisions to be equivalent under uncertainty and certainty. The precautionary
strength is intended to measure of how much decisions (saving) change in response to uncertainty.
The equivalent variation premium should therefore be related to the decision variable, not to the
stochastic variable. Numerical examples in the next section (see Table 1) show that Kimball’s
standard measure of prudence is a misleading indicator of precautionary saving in the present
setting.
3.2 Fixed labor supply
Let us now return to the question of how the ability to adjust labor supply in response to
wage shocks aﬀects precautionary saving. As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider the measure of
precautionary strength when labor supply is not a choice variable. Let ¯ l denote the level that
would be chosen under certainty, i.e. ¯ l = L1 (0) = L2 (0,0). Since labor supply is ﬁxed,











43.3 Flexible labor supply
How does labor-supply ﬂexibility aﬀect precautionary saving? Using the Envelope condition (7)






1 − ¯ l − Lεw
¢2 uccc +2
¡
1 − ¯ l − Lεw
¢
Lεuccl − (2Lε + Lεεw)ucc + L2
εucll + Lεεucl
(1 − Lsw)ucc + uclLs
. (11)
To to interpret this expression, we need further restrictions on the utility function, and I assume
that utility belongs to the class of functions that are consistent with balanced growth and that
are commonly used in macroeconomic analysis. King et al. (1988) show that consistency with





for 0 <μ<1 and μ>1,a n d
u(c,l)=l nc + r(l) (13)
when μ =1 .W h e n μ ≤ 1, r is increasing and concave, and when μ>1, r is decreasing
and convex. These utility functions imply that the income and substitution eﬀects of wage
ﬂuctuations cancel. The derivative of second-period leisure with respect to the wage shock is




1 − ¯ l
¢2 uccc
(1 − Lsw)ucc + uclLs
. (14)
We want to compare the intensity of precautionary motives in settings with diﬀerent degrees
of labor-supply ﬂexibility. Before comparing ηﬁx and ηﬂex, we should ask if the utility function
or the economic environment should be recalibrated when the degree of labor-supply ﬂexibility
changes. The parameters in the utility function are often chosen so that the degree of risk
aversion gets a plausible value. The same parameter values may however result in diﬀerent
degrees of risk aversions when labor supply is ﬂexible rather than ﬁxed. In general, it is therefore
not straightforward to compare utility functions under these diﬀerent assumptions. But in
Appendix A.1, I demonstrate that the utility functions considered here do not suﬀer from this
problem since risk aversion is not aﬀected by labor-supply ﬂexibility. As we will see below,
however, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for total expenditure is not necessarily the
same when labor supply is exogenous as when it is endogenous.
Whether the economic environment, in particular the variance of wage shocks, should be
recalibrated when labor-supply ﬂexibility changes depends on how we use the analysis. If we want
to examine the importance of modeling labor-supply decisions and wage uncertainty rather than
ignoring labor supply and calibrating income volatility, then σ2 should be recalibrated to hold
income variance constant for diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. But if we want to understand how
more or less labor-supply ﬂexibility aﬀects precautionary saving, σ2 should not be recalibrated.
Since the analysis will focus on the latter question, I hold σ2 constant.
To understand how labor-supply ﬂexibility aﬀects precautionary saving, we can thus compare
ηﬂex to ηﬁx. Proposition 1 shows that the measure of precautionary strength is higher when labor
supply is ﬂexible than when labor supply is ﬁxed.
5Proposition 1 Assume that the utility function is consistent with balanced growth. Then
ηﬂex >η ﬁx.
Proof. Use (2) to substitute for c2 in (3) and totally diﬀerentiate to ﬁnd
wLs =
w2ucc
ull + w2ucc − wucl
. (15)
For the additively separable utility function (13) the cross derivative is zero, ucl =0 ,a n dw e
immediately see that 0 <w L s < 1 which establishes that ηﬂex >η ﬁx.C o n s i d e r n o w t h e
multiplicatively separable utility function (12), and rewrite (14) as
ηﬂex =
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢2 uccc
(−ucc)+Ls (wucc − ucl)
.
Since the numerator and −ucc are positive, it is clear that ηﬂex >η ﬁx if 0 >L s (wucc − ucl) >u cc.








Since uc > 0, we know that r>0. The assumptions on r also guarantee that (1 − μ)rll < 0,s o
we see that 0 <w L s <μand Ls > 0.C o n s i d e rn o wwucc − ucl. Again using (12) and (3) we
see that
wucc − ucl = c−μ−1 (−wμr − crl)
= −wrc−μ−1 (17)
< 0.
Since Ls > 0, this establishes that Ls (wucc − ucl) > 0.
We now turn to the second inequality, Ls (wucc − ucl) >u cc.N o t et h a tucc = −μrc−μ−1 and
use (16) and (17) to get








As we demonstrated above, 0 <w L s/μ < 1. It then follows that Ls (wucc − ucl)−ucc > 0 which
establishes the second inequality.
We have compared a setting with ﬂexible labor supply to one with no ﬂexibility and demon-
strated that precautionary saving is larger in the former case. Does this also mean that more
ﬂexibility implies more precautionary saving? There is no general answer, but let us assume









where γ is the elasticity of leisure and b = ¯ l1/γ/
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢
is a constant. Part (a) of Proposition
2 establishes that precautionary saving then increases as leisure becomes more elastic in the
utility function. Part (b) shows that when leisure becomes totally inelastic, saving is the same
as when labor supply is ﬁxed by regulation. The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix.







For other utility functions, however, more elastic labor supply does not always raise the






which is a special case of (12). With this utility function, the measure of precautionary strength
is3
ηﬂex =
γ [1 − α(1 − 1/γ)][2 − α(1 − 1/γ)]
w
(19)
when labor supply is ﬂexible, and
ηﬁx =
α[2 − α(1 − 1/γ)]
w
when labor supply is ﬁxed. Figure 1 plots the measure of precautionary strength, η,a g a i n s tt h e
elasticity γ.T h e ﬁgure shows that the precautionary strength is higher when labor supply is
ﬂexible than when it is ﬁxed, which is what we demonstrated analytically in Proposition 1. More
interestingly, the ﬁgure displays a U-shaped relationship between the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and the precautionary strength when labor supply is ﬂexible.
[Figure 1 here]
This U-shape is in accordance with Kimball and Weil’s (2003) ﬁnding that both high in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution and high risk aversion imply much precautionary saving.4
With the Cobb-Douglas utility function, absolute risk aversion against wage uncertainty is
ra =
α2/γ + α(1 − α)
w
.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for total expenditure, c + wl, depends on the ﬂexi-
bility of labor supply and is
iﬂex = γ






when labor supply is ﬁxed. Note that when labor supply is ﬁxed, we get the standard result
that the intertemporal elasticity is proportional to the inverse of risk aversion. Note also that
3See Appendix A.2 for calculations based on the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
4If risk aversion is high and if the agent has decreasing absolute risk aversion, precautionary behavior reduces
the utility cost of uncertainty. If intertemporal elasticity is high, the utility cost of precautionary behavior that
reallocates resources between periods is low.
7the degree of risk aversion does not fall to zero as γ increases to inﬁnity, and that the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is bounded from above when labor supply is ﬁxed but unbounded
when labor supply is ﬂexible. When labor supply is ﬂexible and γ is high, further increases in γ
still raise the intertemporal elasticity one-for-one but only imply minor reductions in risk aver-
sion. For suﬃciently high γ,t h ee ﬀect of higher intertemporal substitution thus dominates over
the eﬀect from lower risk aversion. Intuitively, labor-supply ﬂexibility facilitates intertemporal
substitution, and raises precautionary saving if risk aversion is held constant. If labor supply
becomes more elastic (higher γ) and risk aversion only falls marginally (as when γ is high),
precautionary saving will increase.
Low (1999) estimates individual wage processes based on data from the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey, and uses these processes to calibrate a life-cycle model with Cobb-Douglas utility.
When labor supply is ﬁxed, he ﬁnds (his table 1 and ﬁgure 3) that a lower elasticity of substi-
tution (i.e. higher risk aversion) raises aggregate savings, but with ﬂexible labor supply he ﬁnds
aU - s h a p e dr e l a t i o nb e t w e e nγ and aggregate savings.5 These ﬁndings are rationalized by the
measures of precautionary strength ηﬁx and ηﬂex displayed in Figure 1, thus indicating that the
results derived in the two-period model generalize to more realistic settings with many periods.
3.4 Numerical examples
When looking at Figure 1, it should be noted that the relevance of η as a measure of precautionary
saving is derived under the assumption that saving is small. Therefore, as γ approaches zero
or inﬁnity, and precautionary saving increases, it is possible that η loses its connection to the
amount of savings.
To evaluate the validity of the precautionary measures for non-negligible risks, I have cal-
culated saving as predicted by these measures in conjunction with equation (6). For various
amounts of wage uncertainty, I have also solved numerically for saving directly from the Euler
equation (5). The results are shown in Table 1. It is clear that the measure of precautionary
strength is strongly related to the actual saving chosen by agents. The level of savings is well
predicted when the standard deviation of wages is ten percent. When the standard deviation
is twice as high, predictions are still roughly accurate, but saving is consistently underesti-
mated. Note also that saving is lower when labor supply is ﬁxed rather than ﬂexible, as we also
showed theoretically for both utility functions. Consistent with Proposition 1, we also see that
the diﬀerence between ﬁxed and ﬂexible labor supply increases as the intertemporal elasticity
increases.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 also reports the measure of prudence calculated as in (9).6 The table clearly shows
that this measure of prudence is misleading when labor supply is a choice variable even if utility
is separable in consumption and leisure. Note also that the standard measure of prudence is
proportional to sﬁx when labor supply is not a choice variable. Using the standard measure of
prudence is then not a problem.
5In the recent version of that paper (Low 2004), aggregate savings is normalized by income rather than
earnings and the discount rate is recalibrated when the elasticity is changed. Because of these normalizations and
recalibrations, it is not possible to compare level diﬀerences between model speciﬁcations.




1 − ¯ l

σ
2/c with additively separable utility and ˆ ψ
ﬂex
=[ 2 − α(1 − 1/γ)]σ
2/(2w)
with Cobb-Douglas utility.
8To understand why Propositions 1 and 2 do not hold for arbitrary utility functions, it may











Note that this utility function becomes identical to (18) when μ → 1, but for other μ the utility
function is not consistent with balanced growth. Using the same setup as in Table 1, it turns
out that saving is higher when labor supply is exogenous than when labor supply is endogenous
if μ>2.5 and γ is small. For high risk aversion, μ, there is a U-shaped relation between the
labor-supply elasticity γ and precautionary saving when labor supply is endogenous. For small
γ, an increase in the elasticity reduces saving but for larger γ, an increase in the elasticity raises





when Lε is evaluated at ε =0and s =0 . This shows that if risk aversion is greater than unity
(μ>1),t h ew e a l t he ﬀect dominates over the substitution eﬀect so that leisure increases in
response to a higher wage. Labor-supply responses then reduce consumption volatility, compared
to the case with exogenous labor supply. The insurance provided by labor-supply responses may
then reduce the need for precautionary saving.
4 Precautionary labor supply
The previous analysis demonstrated that more labor-supply ﬂexibility typically raises precau-
tionary saving. But how does labor supply respond to uncertainty? In our previous analysis the
exact ways in which agents use variations in labor supply to insure against shocks are diﬀuse
since labor supply reacts to realized wage shocks. To isolate the eﬀects from uncertainty, let
us follow Eaton and Rosen (1980), Hartwick (2000), and Parker et al. (2005) and assume that
second-period labor supply must be chosen before uncertainty is resolved. Except for this new
timing, the setting is the same as above. In particular, the second-period wage rate is uncertain,
w2 = w + ε, and agents solve
max
c1,l1,c2,l2,s
u(c1,l 1)+E εu(c2,l 2),
subject to (1) and (2). The ﬁrst-order conditions are then
wuc (c1,l 1)=ul (c1,l 1),
Eε [w2uc (c2,l 2)] = Eεul (c2,l 2),
and
uc (c1,l 1)=E εuc (c2,l 2).
Expanding these ﬁrst-order conditions around ε =0 , s =0 ,a n dσ2 =0 , and ignoring high-order
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l2 − ¯ l =
wucc − ucl
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w2ucc − 2wucl + ull
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Proposition 3 demonstrates that both saving and second-period leisure increase with uncer-
tainty.7






Proof. See the Appendix.
In a similar framework but ignoring saving decisions, Eaton and Rosen (1980), Hartwick
(2000), and Parker et al. (2005) found that uncertainty has ambiguous eﬀects on second-period
labor supply and leisure. In particular, Hartwick demonstrates that labor supply is unaﬀected
by uncertainty when utility has the Cobb-Douglas form. This result is replicated here when









which demonstrates that labor-supply decisions are unaﬀected by uncertainty if saving is ﬁxed.
Why do the results change when saving is endogenous? The intuition is clear. An increase
in uncertainty has a direct precautionary eﬀect on consumption and leisure, tending to reduce
current consumption and leisure and raise future consumption and leisure. But if saving is
ﬁxed, future labor supply must increase for future consumption to increase. It is then not
possible to simultaneously raise future consumption and future leisure. When we allow for
saving decisions, resources can be shifted between periods and Proposition 3 demonstrates that
the direct precautionary eﬀect then prevails, i.e. more uncertainty raises current saving and
labor supply and future consumption and leisure.
This precautionary eﬀect on labor supply and leisure is supported by empirical evidence in
Parker et al. (2005). Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they ﬁnd that wage uncertainty
is an important determinant of labor supply for self-employed American males. Consistent with
the results in Proposition 3, they also ﬁnd that these self-employed individuals tend to work
more when wage uncertainty increases.
This precautionary eﬀect on labor supply is also found in recent numerical studies. In a
calibrated life-cycle model, Low (2004) ﬁnds that individuals with ﬂexible labor supply work hard
at low ages. When they grow older and more wage uncertainty is resolved, labor supply falls.
Low also demonstrates that allowing for labor supply decisions and modelling wage uncertainty
is important for explaining real-world consumption, savings, and labor supply patterns.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has considered precautionary behavior of agents with ﬂexible labor supply in a simple
two-period model. The main insights are that labor-supply ﬂexibility tends to raise saving when
7 It is clear that both c1 and l1 fall when saving increases.
10future wages are uncertain and that future wage uncertainty tends to raise current labor supply
and future leisure.
I have used an unrealistically simple model to illustrate the mechanisms behind precautionary
saving and thus a number of important questions are unanswered. Do the results extend to
multi-period models? Is precautionary saving of quantitative importance? To some extent,
these questions have been addressed by recent research. Whether the results apply to multi-
period dynamic general equilibrium models is not clear. Huggett and Ospina (2001) argue that
the existence of aggregate precautionary savings need not depend on the properties of the utility
function in such models. Their ﬁnding thus indicates that the results do not extend to multi-
period models. But Huggett and Ospina’s ﬁndings have to be interpreted carefully. First, they do
not say that the properties of the utility function are unimportant for the magnitude of savings.
Second, their results only apply to economies with potentially binding liquidity constraints.
In models with no such constraints, for example Wang (2003), the measure of prudence does
matter. Third, Flodén (2005) demonstrates that it is diﬃcult to separate precautionary savings
from life-cycle savings in such models. In the setting studied by Huggett and Ospina, more
uncertainty implies more income volatility. And this volatility in combination with liquidity
constraints can aﬀect life-cycle savings even if income is perfectly predictable.
The quantitative importance of precautionary savings has also been examined. Aiyagari
(1994) found precautionary savings to be modest in a dynamic general equilibrium model with
ﬁxed labor supply, at least for his preferred parameterizations of income uncertainty. But recent
evidence (for example Storesletten et al., 2003) indicate that income processes are substantially
more volatile and persistent than assumed in the early quantitative models. In a calibrated life-
cycle model, Low (1999, 2004) shows that the quantitative eﬀects on savings and labor supply
can be substantial, and the eﬀects he ﬁnds are consistent with the theoretical predictions in the
present paper.
Appendix A: Proofs and calculations
A.1 Risk aversion
To measure risk attitudes to wage uncertainty, consider an agent with wealth s in the beginning of
the second period and ask how much wealth the agent is prepared to give up to avoid wage shocks,
ε.8 The risk attitude is then measured by the premium π that solves v(s − π,0) = Ev(s,ε),





From the Envelope condition, we know that vs = uc. W ee v a l u a t er i s ka v e r s i o na ts =0and
ε =0 . Using the budget constraint and recalling that Lε =0for the utility functions considered,
we get vε =
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢
uc and vεε =
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢2 ucc both when labor supply is endogenous and when
labor supply is exogenous. Consequently,
ra = −
¡




8 This is the risk attitude to what Drèze and Modigliani (1972) call “timeless” uncertainty, i.e. the risk agents
face after having chosen ﬁrst period saving.
11A.2 Cobb-Douglas utility







From the budget constraint this in turn implies that c2 = α(w + ε + s) when labor supply is
ﬂexible. The indirect second-period utility function is then
v(s,ε)=





where K is a constant. Diﬀerentiate (A.3) to obtain the precautionary strength (19).





α2/γ + α(1 − α)
w
.
As demonstrated in Appendix (A.1), this measure of risk aversion applies both to the case with
ﬁxed and ﬂexible labor supply.
Let x = c+wl denote total expenditure in a period, and let R denote the gross interest rate
so that the second-period budget constraint is x2 = c2 + w2l2 = w2 + Rs. The intertemporal







When labor supply is ﬂexible, (A.2) and the budget constraint imply that x = c/α.W et h e ng e t










2 .U s i n g c = x − w¯ l and evaluating the elasticity at x1 = x2 we ﬁnd
iﬁx =
¡
x − w¯ l
¢
/[x(1 − α(1 − μ))] = γ/[1 + γ (1/α − 1)].
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2









where K1 ≡ 2(1− l)











































where K2 ≡− wucc/
¡
ull + w2ucc
¢2 > 0. The coeﬃcient b is deﬁned as
b =
¯ l1/γ
1 − ¯ l
,























which concludes the proof of part (a).





which implies that ηﬁx is invariant to γ. From (A.4) we get
ηﬂex =
K1







Since 0 <l<1,w es e et h a tlimγ→0 Ls =0 . This veriﬁes the Proposition,
lim
γ→0
ηﬂex = K1 = ηﬁx.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Concavity of the utility function implies that the denominator in (20) is positive. To show that
∂s/∂σ > 0 we thus have to show that the numerator in (20) is positive, i.e. that








− (ull − wucl)
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢
uccc > 0.




1 − ¯ l
¢
uccc.
13Since ull < 0 and uccc > 0 we see that NS > 0.
Consider next the multiplicatively separable utility function (12). Since derivatives are eval-
uated at ε =0and s =0 , we have c =
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢
w, and using the ﬁrst-order condition for leisure,










We have assumed that rl > 0 when μ<1 and rl < 0 when μ>1 so rl/(1 − μ) is positive.
We have also assumed that rll < 0 when μ<1 and that rll > 0 when μ>1.S i n c euc > 0 by
assumption, we have implicitly assumed that r>0.S o rrll/rl < 0, and we see that NS > 0.
We have thus established part (a) of the proof.















1 − ¯ l
¢
uccl
w2ucc − 2wucl + ull
¡
1 − ¯ l
¢
σ (A.6)
Let NL denote the numerator in the second term in (A.6). For the additively separable utility
function we get
NL =2 ucc + cuccc = −2c−2 +2 cc−3 =0 .
For the multiplicatively separable utility function we get
NL =2 ucc + cuccc − (1 − μ)rr−1
l uccl
= −2μc−μ−1r + μ(μ +1 )cc−μ−2r + μ(1 − μ)rr−1
l c−μ−1rl
=0 .













−c−μrl (1 − μ)
−1




where the numerator is negative since rl/(1 − μ) > 0, and where the denominator is negative
by concavity of u. This establishes that ∂l2/∂σ > 0.
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16Table 1
Predictive power of precautionary measure when uncertainty is not negligible
ﬂexible labor supply ﬁxed labor supply
σ =1 σ =2 σ =1 σ =2
γs s (η) ˆ ψs s (η) ˆ ψs s (η) ss (η)
separable utility, u =l nc +
b(l1−1/γ−1)
1−1/γ
0.10 .023 0.023 0.100 0.099 0.092 0.400 0.020 0.020 0.086 0.080
0.50 .036 0.035 0.100 0.151 0.140 0.400 0.020 0.020 0.086 0.080
1.00 .051 0.050 0.100 0.215 0.200 0.400 0.020 0.020 0.086 0.080
2.00 .081 0.080 0.100 0.344 0.320 0.400 0.020 0.020 0.086 0.080
10.00 .325 0.320 0.100 1.373 1.280 0.400 0.020 0.020 0.086 0.080




0.10 .067 0.064 0.280 0.322 0.258 1.120 0.058 0.056 0.288 0.224
0.50 .043 0.042 0.120 0.183 0.168 0.480 0.024 0.024 0.104 0.096
1.00 .051 0.050 0.100 0.215 0.200 0.400 0.020 0.020 0.086 0.080
2.00 .073 0.072 0.090 0.308 0.288 0.360 0.018 0.018 0.077 0.072
10.00 .266 0.262 0.082 1.118 1.050 0.328 0.017 0.016 0.070 0.066




.F u r t h e r m o r e α =0 .40,a n db is a function of γ so that
labor supply equals α when σ
2 =0 .
The table compares ‘true’ savings, solved numerically from the ﬁrst-order conditions, to the
amount of savings predicted by the measures of precautionary strength. Note that ˆ ψ ∼ s(η)
when labor supply is ﬁxed.Figure 1
Precautionary strength with Cobb-Douglas utility

















The graph relates the precautionary strength for ﬂexible and ﬁxed labor supply (ηﬂex and ηﬁx)






where α =0 .40.